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The recent EU enlargement poses immense challenges for EU regional policy. This is not only 
due to the significantly increased disparities within the enlarged EU and the by far lower per 
capita income in the Recently Acceded Member States, but also because these economies are far 
from being homogenous. However, the characteristics of these countries will not be the focus of 
this paper, but rather the question will be discussed, whether – or more precisely under which 
conditions – EU structural funds can be effective in making a significant contribution to real 
convergence in Europe. Based on theoretical insights and experiences in the incumbent Member 
States, conclusions will be drawn (though not exclusively) for the new member states. 
In view of the very limited budgetary means of EU cohesion policy, representing less than 0.5 per 
cent of the EU-15 GDP, the following conditions will be identified as being important for 
maximising the impact: First, sound and supportive national policies, including macroeconomic 
policies, national regional policies and good governance, are an essential precondition for the 
achievement of a real impact. Second, the scarce financial means must be concentrated spatially, 
i.e. on the poorest Member States and regions and particularly in these countries they must be 
focused on national growth and growth poles rather than on equalising living conditions across 
the country and more dispersion of economic activity. Third, the strategic design of Structural 
Funds programmes must allow for a concentration on those types of expenditures most likely to 
lead to growth and employment. Fourth, ways have to be found to achieve the most effective use 
of EU Structural Funds. Before these conditions for maximising the impact of Structural Funds 
are described, empirical evidence and methods for assessing their contribution to real 
convergence in Europe will be discussed. 
 
1  Evidence of structural funds impact 
Can European Regional Policy contribute to real convergence? Some authors raise strong doubts 
by criticising Structural Funds as having only a marginal, if any, impact on real convergence in 
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Europe.
2 However, in contrast to the impression one could get from the frequently cited studies, 
with few exceptions
3 most regressions tend to find a significant positive effect of cohesion 
support on national growth and convergence.
4 At the regional level, across the EU and in some 
case within countries, most studies also identify a positive impact.
5  
Nevertheless, most of these attempts to link national and regional GDP or productivity growth to 
cohesion assistance by econometric regressions are plagued with methodological, econometric 
and data weaknesses. Even if in principle regressions would be expected to be an adequate 
approach for a realistic “ex-post” assessment, standard growth regressions testing for absolute or 
conditional ß-convergence cannot as such provide any evidence on the impact and effectiveness 
of the EU cohesion policy. No causality can be inferred from either the occurrence or the lack of 
convergence or from its speed which may result from many economic, social and policy factors 
other than the EU assistance. No structural model of such a complex mechanism as growth can be 
represented by a single equation linking the former to one variable i.e. the amount of Structural 
Funds transfers as was done in Boldrin and Canova (2001) or two variables if initial income per 
capita is also considered. Moreover, since the beneficiaries of EU cohesion policy are poor 
economies, the amount of EU assistance works in some regressions as a proxy for the omitted 
variables that presumably explain why they have below average incomes.
6 As a result, the 
estimated coefficient on the volume of aid is negative while the inclusion of additional variables 
in the equation, even in a simple form, leads to a positive impact of EU assistance on growth.
7 In 
other words, imposing the assumption of absolute convergence creates a downward bias on the 
estimated impact of cohesion support while it can be significant and positive if convergence is 
only conditional, which seems to be the consensus view today. In addition, such regressions, 
when performed at regional (NUTS II) level, are faced with acute problems of data availability 
and reliability. Not only is the bulk of cohesion support national or transregional and thus 
difficult to attribute to regions but available statistics are insufficient to control for other factors 
that can influence growth. 
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Consequently, results of regression based impact assessments have to be considered with extreme 
caution as they are not only very sensitive to the different methods, time periods and data sets on 
which they are based but also fail in many cases to include sufficient control variables to explain 
the complex convergence process. 
As an alternative method for the assessment of the impact of the EU cohesion policy 
macroeconomic model simulations are applied. Modelling has two main advantages. It shows 
how the policy affects the demand and supply sides of the domestic economy depending on a 
wide range of other factors and allows for a counterfactual (i.e. without policy) simulation. On 
the other hand, simulations tend to assume that cohesion support is fully turned into productive 
public investment, overlooking possible weaknesses in policy delivery. They may thus assess the 
potential rather than the actual impact of the cohesion policy.
8 However,  several positive effects 
are not reflected in the model simulations. Possible examples are: strengthening the strategic 
planning capacity by setting-up of an integrated development strategy in a multi-annual 
framework; introducing or enforcing the monitoring and evaluation culture or financial 
management and control rules and minimal standards for public procurement. 
Two frequently used macro-economic models are QUEST II and Hermin, trying to assess both 
(short term) demand side and (long term) supply side effects by comparing the simulation results 
with and without Structural Funds support.
9 The Hermin results of the ex-post evaluation for the 
last programming period (1994-1999) identify their continuing supply-side effects by assuming 
that funding terminates after the programming period. The results for the cohesion countries (see 
figure 1) range from a relatively modest long-term impact in the cases of Greece and Spain to a 
real GDP level in Portugal that is more than 2 per cent higher in 2010 than in the absence of 
Structural Funds and national co-financing, both ending in 2000 according to the assumption 
made for the calculation. 
 
Figure 1: Impact of the European regional policy, programming period 1994-99 
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Note: Bars: CSF expenditure as percentage of GDP of the programming period 1994 – 1999, i.e. under the 
assumption of ending support in 2000; lines: CSF induced change of GDP level against baseline in percent. 
Source: European Commission 2003a. 
 
The results of the ex-ante macroeconomic evaluations for the new Member States are not easily 
comparable as the applied methodologies are heterogeneous. However, they also show a 
substantial impact. In Poland, for example, according to the Hermin model’s impact assessment, 
real GDP would be higher in 2010 by approximately 1 per cent due to the support provided in the 
period 2004 to 2006.
10 
Summing up, while the magnitude of the impact may vary depending on the model specifications, 
the economy’s characteristics, the amount of assistance and the types of public investments 
targeted, all model simulations conclude that cohesion support contributes significantly to growth 
and employment at national and, when analysed, at regional level. The role of the Structural 
Funds is, in essence, to co-finance investments in physical and human capital, using financial 
means coming mainly from other economies. If public investment has an impact on productivity   5
and growth as well as a leverage rather than a crowding-out effect on private investment, EU 
cohesion policy can be expected under both the neo-classical and the endogenous growth models 
to be effective since it adds to physical and human capital stocks and promotes technological 
progress. EU regional policy should therefore have the potential to significantly contribute to 
growth and employment in the recipient regions and Member States. There is nevertheless a 
range of factors that could hamper such effectiveness. To what extent this potential is realised, 
therefore depends on various conditions.  
 
2  The role of national policies 
A sound and supportive national economic and political environment can be regarded as a 
necessary condition for maximising the impact of Structural Funds. Structural Funds cannot 
achieve a self-supporting growth led by additional private investment, if national economic 
policies have not achieved sound framework conditions. In this context, the importance of the 
national political environment has three main aspects: First, a sound macroeconomic and 
regulatory framework, national regional policies, and good governance including administrative 
capacity. 
In the area of a sound macro-economic environment the general and country-specific 
recommendations of the Broad Economic Policy Guidelines (BEPGs), where in 2004 the new 
Member States have been included for the first time (European Commission 2004a), show the 
still existing need of further reforms and progress. Several countries have also been given specific 
recommendations concerning their regional labour markets. In particular, measures allowing 
wages to better reflect productivity and skill differentials would facilitate the attraction of 
investment flows into higher unemployment areas. However, the 2004 report on the 
implementation of the 2003-2005 BEPGs (European Commission 2004b) indicates that progress 
made by the EU-15 Member States remains uneven and overall insufficient. 
Empirical studies show that a sound economic-political environment not only increases the 
growth and employment perspectives of the corresponding country and its regions, but is also 
crucial for the effectiveness of international support. Drawing on a study by Burnside and Dollar 
(2000), Ederveen et al. (2002) perform cross-country regressions on the effectiveness of 
Structural Funds with panel data for 13 EU countries and 7 year-periods from 1960 to 1995, 
based on a standard neo-classical growth model as introduced by Mankiw, Romer and Weil 
(1992). When they introduce into their regression a variable that proxies openness; the interaction 
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is significantly positive. Similar results are obtained with some variables which proxy the 
institutional context, namely a corruption perception index and an index of institutional quality. 
These results, in line with previous studies on the determinants of long-term growth, tend to 
confirm that the effectiveness of the cohesion policy is highly dependent on the growth-
orientation of national policies. 
EU Structural Funds have to a certain extent internalised some of the implications: First, the 
payments of the Cohesion Fund are conditional upon sound public finances. Second, a reference 
to the key role of national policies for the impact of Structural Funds has been introduced, in 
particular, in the programming documents 2004-2006 for the new Member States. These include, 
inter alia, macroeconomic stability, the continuation of privatisation and restructuring, a reduction 
and re-orientation of state aid, the implementation of mechanisms reducing labour costs and 
improving flexibility (and mobility) in the labour market. They can translate into concrete 
requirements e.g. on the pursuit of labour market reforms including the obligation to report to the 
Commission on progress and results.  
Besides the macroeconomic environment, an effective national regional policy is needed for the 
achievement of real convergence between European regions. Regional policy instruments used by 
the Member States can be classified mainly into two categories: on the one hand instruments with 
a rather redistributive character, aiming at an equalisation of public finance resources or living 
conditions among regions; on the other hand pro-active policy measures aiming at achieving 
economic development in the poorest regions. However, even if a “tendency for the policy focus 
to shift to wealth creation from wealth distribution” (Yuill and Wishlade 2001) can be observed, 
national regional policies, if compared with the pro-active design of EU Structural Funds, are still 
rather redistributive in nature. In Germany, for example, estimates on the gross transfer to eastern 
Germany arrive at € 116 billion in 2003 and net transfers representing nearly one third of eastern 
German GDP. The main part of these transfers is redistributive as transfers via the social security 
system or unconditional grants represent 45 per cent and 21 per cent of gross transfers 
respectively. In contrast, only 9 per cent of gross transfers are spent for support to the private 
sector and 13 per cent for infrastructure investment.
11  A mix of fiscal transfer schemes and active 
regional policy exists also in other Member States like Spain.
12  
A further factor of crucial importance for the impact of Structural Funds is a sound institutional 
and public administration environment. One of the expected effects of Structural Funds is the 
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improvement of the administrative capacity due to co-financing of capacity-building measures 
and the introduction of corresponding legislation. This is of particular importance to the new 
Member States as  their institutional quality is in general poorer than in the old Member States
13 
and  because they still have to adapt to the management system of the Structural Funds as most 
incumbent Member States have done more than a decade ago. Consequently, guaranteeing a 
substantial absorption of the Structural Funds can be seen as one of the crucial challenges for the 
new Member States. 
 
3  Achieving spatial concentration 
For the achievement of a significant impact on convergence in Europe, cohesion policy has in the 
first place to concentrate its scarce financial means, representing about  half a percentage point of 
EU GDP, on those regions and Member States most in need. Eligibility criteria for Cohesion and 
Structural Funds try to achieve this spatial focus. While the Cohesion Fund  supports Member 
States having, in the reference period, a Gross National Income (GNI) per capita in Purchasing 
Power Standards (PPS) below 90 per cent of the EU, some 65 per cent of Structural Funds (SF) 
are allocated to the poorest, so-called Objective 1 regions with a GDP per capita in PPS below 75 
per cent of the EU average. Figure 2 shows on the one hand that these eligibility criteria have 
been instrumental in achieving a spatial focus, on the other hand it makes clear that, at the same 
time, relatively rich countries, well above the EU average, also receive substantial support. This 
has led to strong criticisms and proposals to grant Structural Funds only to poorer Member States, 
while comparatively rich Member States should support their poor regions from their own 
financial means and reduce their contributions to the EU budget accordingly.
14 This discussion 
gained importance through EU enlargement  because the need to spatially concentrate Structural 
Funds has become even more urgent with the accession of ten countries with income levels below 
– and often far below - the EU average, increasing the diversity within the EU substantially. 
 
Figure 2: Relation between per capita income and funds by member state 
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Notes: Funds: Annual average of Estimated Commitments for Structural Funds and Cohesion Fund as % of GDP. 
GDP: GDP per capita in PPS in 2003, average of EU15 = 100. 
Source: Own calculations based on Eurostat and European Commission (2004c). 
 
An additional effect of accession is that the average level of GDP per head has decreased 
statistically by nearly 10 per cent. As a consequence, some regions in EU-15 Member States 
having a GDP per capita in PPS below the ceiling of 75 per cent surpass this threshold when 
measured against the EU-25, exclusively due to the inclusion of poorer Member States.
15 On the 
one hand, it can be argued that their economic situation has not changed through the purely 
statistical effect and therefore support has to be continued. On the other hand, allocation of scarce 
financial means requires prioritisation and Structural Funds should favour only the poorest, i.e. 
nearly exclusively the new Member States and their regions. 
 
A second crucial aspect of spatial concentration of the Funds is the possibility of an 
equity/efficiency trade-off as for example described by the Kuznets-Williamson hypothesis
16 
Particularly in earlier stages of a country’s catching-up process the maximisation of national 
growth can be accompanied by a (temporary) rise in regional inequalities as economic growth is 
driven by only few growth poles. Current experience of the new Member States supports this 
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argument as national growth in these countries seems to be largely localised in the most dynamic 
areas around the capital cities and other major agglomerations where investment, including public 
investment, is likely to be more productive.  
These findings have important implications for regional policy. Namely, consideration should be 
given to proper sequencing when designing the strategy for EU regional policy by taking into 
account the differences between the stages of development achieved in the catch-up process. In 
those countries where the convergence gap is highest, in particular when the territory is 
completely covered under Objective 1 like in most new Member States, more emphasis should be 
given to national growth as trying to counteract market forces would be inefficient if not even 
unsuccessful.
17 In those incumbent Member States which have already reached an income level 
which is closer to the EU average, relatively more focus can be given to the reduction of regional 
income dispersion. 
Sequencing and prioritisation have, to some extent, been implemented in the EU-15 cohesion 
countries. In Ireland, the country with the most impressive growth performance, the main 
objective since the 1960s has been the maximisation of national growth. It is only towards the 
end of the 1990s that a specific regional policy has emerged and more emphasis has been given to 
the reduction of regional inequality. Similarly, in the 2004-2006 period, structural expenditures in 
the new Member States have been mainly focused on national, interregional measures. 
 
Linked to the trade-off between equity and efficiency within a country, the third aspect of spatial 
concentration concerns the intra-regional focus of regional policies. According to the New 
Economic Geography (NEG), enterprises can tend to locate in clusters and areas with high 
purchasing power and close to other enterprises in order to benefit from agglomeration 
economies.
18 This can at least partially explain why, in the new Member States, business 
activities tend to locate in the most developed areas. 
In this context regional policy has to make a strategic decision between supporting on the one 
hand the development of clusters and growth poles and thereby increasing overall growth or 
trying on the other hand to favour the dispersion of economic activities. The latter may be 
particularly inefficient at early development stages and may run counter to market forces. For 
instance, the relocation of public enterprises to southern Italy from the 1960s to the mid-1970s 
with national support under the form of capital grants and wage subsidies did not succeed in 
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attracting small and medium-sized private firms and thus in enlarging the industrial basis in the 
South. While clusters have developed in the Centre-North, no similar agglomeration effects can 
be found in the Mezzogiorno. On the other hand, the promotion of clusters has been a major 
feature of the Irish development strategy since the 1970s and horizontal and vertical linkages 
between industries and research centres are promoted in Portugal. However, as has been argued 
by some authors, artificially creating comparative advantages has in most cases proved to have 
little impact.
19 Therefore, regional policy should rather try to build upon existing clusters than try 
to create new ones. Dispersion of activities is more an issue in relatively wealthy member states 
where costs of agglomeration, such as high factor prices, pollution, and congestion tend to 
overwhelm agglomeration benefits. However, a more complete internalisation of negative 
externalities through efficient pricing and environmental taxes may be more efficient instruments 
than regional policy in order to divert activities towards other areas. Still, it has to be underlined 
that firstly: giving priorities to some regions does not imply a black or white decision, secondly: 
several measures like intra- and inter-regional infrastructure investments also link remote areas to 
growth poles and that thirdly the population in rural areas are also taking part in projects like 
education measures in urban centres. 
 
4  The strategy and investment mix 
EU regional policy is based on a pro-active, allocative approach aiming primarily to enhance 
efficiency and growth in the economy supported. The co-financing of investment targeting the 
determinants of long-term sustainable growth should: 
•  improve the availability of public goods, i.e. mainly basic infrastructure, 
•  enhance human capital, and 
•  improve the business environment for private investment and offering investment support. 
However, empirical evidence indicates that not all of these investments are equally effective 
under all circumstances. Rodriguez-Pose and Fratesi (2002) test the design of the development 
strategies co-financed by the Structural Funds. They regress Structural Funds commitments for 
each of the four main areas of intervention (infrastructure – business/tourism – human resources – 
agriculture/rural development) on regional growth in all NUTS 2 and Objective 1 regions for 
three periods from 1989 to 1999, also taking into account a number of structural variables. They 
find that agricultural/rural support has a strong immediate effect on growth in Objective 1 regions 
but this impact vanishes almost immediately and turns negative in later years, suggesting that it 
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fulfils an income support rather than a sustainable development objective. Returns to 
infrastructure in transport and environment as well as business/tourism are relatively 
disappointing having little or no short-term or medium-term impact. However, for infrastructure, 
this result may be due to a too short period to assess its full impact. Human resources, on the 
other hand, have both short-term and medium-term impacts if some characteristics of the labour 
market are controlled for. On the whole, regions with a balanced distribution of funds have 
performed well while those with unbalanced strategies (e.g. emphasis on business support or 
agricultural/rural preferences) have not. Such results contribute to highlight the importance of 
adequate strategies i.e. the investment mix chosen for co-financing as the third condition for an 
effective regional policy.  
As the list of eligible expenditures for EU Structural Funds support is long and not all eligible 
expenditures can be regarded as equally effective, the strategy and main areas of support have to 
be adapted to the needs of the corresponding Member States and regions. Therefore, programmes 
are set up in a bottom-up approach. Regional and national authorities present, ideally based on a 
sound analysis of the current situation including a SWOT analysis and with involvement of the 
relevant actors, development plans which are then negotiated in partnership with the European 
Commission and adopted as multi-annual programmes. Even if the programmes have to reflect 
the needs in the individual area, both theoretical and empirical economic literature offers some 
general guidelines which a strategy could follow and what should be avoided. Therefore, in the 
following section evidence on the effectiveness of different types of investment is first discussed 
before analysing the strategy chosen for Structural Funds support in the old and the new Member 
States. 
 
Infrastructure projects are one of the main areas of Structural Funds co-financed investment. A 
relatively abundant literature argues that enhanced endowments in transport infrastructure raise 
the total factor productivity of all inputs (i.e. via reduced transaction costs for enterprises and also 
improving workers’ labour mobility) and thus the growth perspectives of regional or national 
economies. This is supported by evaluations of Structural Funds programmes and numerous 
empirical studies.
20 However, the available empirical evidence is still subject to debate as 
causality and econometric issues have not been fully clarified. Three main points seem to emerge 
from the existing literature. First, the provision of transport infrastructure can be regarded as a 
necessary precondition for economic development, but will not per se solve all problems of 
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lagging regions, especially if they lack adequate factors of production. Second, the returns to such 
investments are probably high when infrastructure is scarce and basic networks have not been 
completed but may be decreasing if a certain threshold has been reached. Both theoretical models 
(see e.g. Baldwin et al. 2003) and empirical studies (e.g. Bougheas et al. 2000) show a non-
monotonic relationship between infrastructure and long-run growth. This is to be taken into 
account in the context of EU enlargement, where regions with a substantial lack of infrastructure 
(in most new Member States) co-exist with regions with higher endowments. Finally, according 
to the New Economic Geography, infrastructure opening up interregional trade may under certain 
conditions have the paradoxical effect of concentrating production in the wealthier regions. 
However, the evidence is quite mixed. Concentration has been highlighted in some cases
21 while 
a positive effect on disadvantaged regions has been evidenced for others.
22  
Besides transport infrastructure, increasing support is given to environmental infrastructure like 
waste water treatment plants. Even if the short term contribution of these investments to growth 
and employment is ambiguous
23, European Structural Funds contribute, if effectively spent, to the 
achievement of a long-term sustainable development in all European regions. Finally, as the 
discussion of the “new economy” has shown
24, not only investment in transport but also in 
information and communication infrastructure can substantially contribute to productivity and 
growth. Therefore, investments in information society related infrastructure are eligible for 
structural funds co-financing as long as similar investments cannot be expected to be undertaken 
by private means. 
 
Recent theories of economic growth, in particular the literature on endogenous growth, point to 
the important role of human capital. The result that economies only grow fast if they have high 
levels of human capital seems robust both theoretically and empirically. This is confirmed by 
cross-country studies like Mankiw, Romer and Weil (1992) and Barro and Lee (1994) and similar 
studies inspired by these papers.
25 However, studies tend to assess human capital at a very 
aggregate level without precisely defining the mechanisms through which it influences economic 
growth. The specific types of educational and training expenditures to be undertaken by policy-
                                                 
21   See Combes and Lafourcade (2001) or Faini (1983). 
22   See e.g. Martin and Rogers (1995). 
23  See chapter 6 of the European Economy Review 2004, European Commission 2004c. 
24  See e.g. Stierle 2000. 
25   Some studies (e.g. Pritchett (1998) or Caselli et al. (1996)) using different (panel data) techniques have questioned the link 
between education and productivity, but recent investigations explain their negative results by poor data and econometric 
problems.    13
makers are thus less clear. A recent study
26 provides policy suggestions, to be adapted to the 
specific national and regional conditions, in favour of a moderate increase in human capital 
investment but not in favour of an across-the-board increase in subsidies for post-compulsory 
education as incentives for individuals to invest are found to be adequate. More important may be 
the elimination of implicit barriers to access to higher education such as liquidity constraints and 
lower basic skills levels among individuals from disadvantaged backgrounds. In addition, 
guidance on the most productive types of investments include giving technology-related skills to 
a broad segment of the population, supporting life-long learning and improving conditions for the 
accumulation of research-related human capital. 
 
Even if in the area of the support for the private business sector some part of the Structural Funds 
are used to co-finance the provision of technical and business services (mainly to SMEs), 
technology diffusion and more market-based forms of investment financing, the co-financing of 
direct state aid to enterprises remains quantitatively a main area of intervention.
27 Such aid can 
have important deadweight, displacement or substitution effects which call into question the 
impact of support and subsequently the effectiveness of EU cohesion policy.
28 
Evaluations of state aid are relatively scarce. Nevertheless, the extent of their effects has been 
assessed by some studies, in nearly all cases concluding that only 10 per cent to 20 per cent of the 
projects are not subject to total or partial deadweight.
29 Consequently, co-financing of state aid 
seems not be the most effective channel for EU cohesion policy. Therefore, EU cohesion policy 
should be targeted to those investments where deadweight seems lower according to existing 
studies, namely in start-up companies, in small businesses and for technological upgrading, 
research and development and human capital training.  
 
Besides these types of investment, support for rural development, mainly for the agricultural 
sector, is quantitatively the most important area. However, the economic importance of primary 
agriculture for the economy as a whole is limited, even in predominantly rural areas within the 
enlarged EU. In addition, the trends clearly indicate a further decline in the agricultural share in 
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gross value added and employment. Thus, in order to help lagging rural areas, it seems necessary 
to concentrate the efforts increasingly outside the agricultural sector. The standard measures 
targeted to the agricultural sector are, furthermore, not exempt from criticism. Early retirement 
schemes for instance have little proven effects on the restructuring of the sector and run counter 
to the Community employment strategy by reducing the participation rate. The lump sum support 
to farmers in rural areas is neither targeted nor supportive to a positive sectoral restructuring. 
Moreover, empirical studies
30 indicate that farm investment support could be implemented more 
efficiently. Finally, it should not be forgotten that this sector already receives substantial financial 
support from the market and income oriented measures of the Common Agricultural Policy. 
Furthermore, Structural Funds also offer co-financing of projects where the link to economic 
growth and employment is in most cases doubtful. For example, a positive impact on regional 
development will be difficult to find for most small scale cultural projects or support for sport 
facilities. 
 
The investment mix in the EU-15 and the new Member States 
For the EU-15 Objective 1 regions (see tables 1 and 2) there is mixed evidence on whether 
financial support is shifting over time towards investments that are more conducive to growth and 
employment or not. Using very rough categories and only considering Structural Funds, the share 
of basic infrastructure has increased in the first years of the current programming period 
compared with the late 1990s. In contrast, the share of the support for human resource 
development has been reduced. However, as Table 2 displays, this is not only due to investments 
in “concrete rather than brain”, but it is also due to a stronger focus on environmental and ICT 
investments. In addition, Structural Funds can be more easily absorbed by large projects than by 
smaller and more complex projects. Consequently, Member States might have the incentive to 
use structural funds rather for transport infrastructure projects like constructing highways while 
using national means rather for small projects in the area of human resource development. In fact, 
national and structural funds show diverging developments for infrastructure and HRD related 
investments. 
 
Table 1: Financial allocation of public spending eligible under Objective 1 in % of total 
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Infrastructure  51.7 43.5 58.4 
human resources development  28.4  36.2  19.8 
National 
without EU 
co-financing  aid to the productive sector  19.9  20.3  21.8 
Infrastructure  40.3 39.0 43.3 
human resources development  20.2  24.8  24.4 
National co-
financing 
aid to the productive sector  39.5  36.2  32.3 
Infrastructure  33.4 36.1 44.9 
human resources development  29.3  28.8  25.8 
EU 
Structural 
Funds  aid to the productive sector  37.3  35.1  29.3 
Percentage share of the corresponding investment area in total expenditures excluding other spending. Data for the 
new Member States are ex-ante.  
Source: Own calculations based on tables submitted for the verification of additionality of Objective 1 programmes. 
 
Table 2: Financial allocation of EU Structural Funds in EU-15 in % of total 
   Objective 1  Non-Obj.1 
   1994-99  2000-06  2000-06 
Infrastructure 29.8  41.3  14.1 
Transport 15.7  19.8  3.5 
ICT 1.6  3.5  1.7 
Energy 2.3  1.2  0.4 
Environment & water  7.5  12.8  7.5 
Health & social inf.  1.7  3.9  0.7 
Other 1.1  0  0.3 
Human resources  24.5  23.1  53.3 
Education 6.9  n/a  n/a 
Training 17.4  n/a  n/a 
Other 0.1  n/a  n/a 
Productive Environment  41  33.8  29.1 
Industry and services  19.9  11.3  15.8 
RDTI 3.5  6  4.5 
Agric./rural dev./ fishery  15.2  13.7  5.1 
Tourism 2.4  2.7  3.7 
Other 4.6  1.8  3.4 
Total 100  100  100 
Source: European Commission 2003, p. 56 and 2004 pp. 182 and 185. 
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In the recent process of Objective 1 programming for the new Member States, the focus was on 
the main determinants of higher productivity and, in those countries where the labour market 
situation is a key challenge, on a rapid improvement in the use of human resources. Growth and 
employment have thus been the two main criteria against which priorities, investments and 
measures were selected. The approach of the new Member States and the Commission was to 
maximise, in partnership during the negotiations, measures with higher growth and employment 
potential, to promote concentration, suppress or at least reduce redistributive types of measures 
and to avoid the creation of distortions in economic activity. Against the background of uneven 
effectiveness of different investment areas as highlighted by available evidence, the aim was to 
select both adequate priorities and an effective mix of measures within each priority. The final 
results on the level of the Operational Programmes are illustrated for the four largest new 
Member States in table 3. Even if the figures on the financial allocation are not directly 
comparable,
31 they indicate that the higher investment need, compared to the EU-15, in the area 
of basic infrastructure has been reflected in the programmes and that more emphasis has been 
given to human resource development. 
 







Infrastructure* Agriculture,  rural 
development incl. 
fishery 
Poland 35.9  17.8  15.1  14.1  16.8 
Hungary 18.0  28.2  21.5  16.4 15.9 
Czech Republic  31.2  21.9  17.9  16.9  12.0 
Slovakia   27.3  14.5  40.6  17.6 
Figures given in % of total, Cohesion Fund and Technical Assistance Priorities excluded. *Excluding regional and 
local infrastructure, except for Slovakia. Source: European Commission 2004c. 
 
For regional programmes the aim was to avoid that they mimic the CSFs at regional level and 
widely disperse resources into numerous priorities and measures with most likely little effect on 
long-run growth and employment. Consequently, an even distribution of the Structural Funds 
across the whole territory as well as one favouring the most backward regions has been avoided. 
Focus was given on investment in areas and urban centres with growth potential while providing 
the necessary infrastructure to allow for their inter-connections and connections with major 
                                                 
31   Programmes with similar objectives are in different countries not identically designed. For example, a major part of the Polish 
Integrated Regional Development Programme is devoted to infrastructure, largely explaining the differences compared to other 
new Member States in the percentage shares of the corresponding two Operational Programmes.   17
transit routes. Financing of small-scale regional transport infrastructure was substantially 
reduced. The numerous requests for regional/local cultural or sport facilities were reduced in 
terms of financial allocations and made subject to conditions, in particular economic 
sustainability and significant regional economic impact. This has resulted in an overall scaling 
down of the regional programmes.  
Since the development of human resources is key to long-term growth, the allocations to the 
corresponding programmes were increased both where employment is a major challenge as in 
Poland and where higher qualifications are called for by the upgrading of economic activity and 
by the need to activate participation in the labour market. Especially for human resources the 
measures have to be tailored to the country’s situation. For example in Hungary where both 
unemployment and the participation rate are low and where in some sectors and regions shortages 
of highly skilled workers can be observed, the focus was put on those measures likely to increase 
participation and on education and training. In contrast, for example in Poland and Slovakia 
where unemployment is a key challenge, measures for social inclusion were granted limited 
financial allocation to the benefit of active labour market policies and in the latter support was 
shifted towards groups with the highest possibility to (re-)enter the labour market like the young. 
Due to the high deadweight and displacement effects of state aid and because of the already high 
level of state aid in most new Member States,
32 it was in most cases agreed to reduce the support 
of EU Structural Funds to this area. This resulted, if not counterbalanced by increasing support 
for the business environment as in the Czech Republic, in a reduction of the 
competitiveness/enterprises financial allocations e.g. in Poland and Hungary. Simultaneously, 
state aid was re-oriented towards SMEs and targets ensuring that priority is given to SMEs in the 
financial allocation have been set for example in Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic. All 
sectoral preferences were suppressed to avoid “protecting” declining industries or trying to pick 
up winners by targeting manufacturing or specific “high-tech” sectors. The remaining measures 
in this priority are thus more focused on soft aid for knowledge, innovation and technology and 
the business environment. 
More emphasis was put on infrastructure as this is regarded as a major weakness impeding higher 
growth in several new Member States. A hierarchy of priorities for the period 2004-2006 were 
followed with a view to maximising investments that yield higher returns in terms of enterprises 
competitiveness while facilitating labour mobility. This has lead, depending on the situation in 
                                                 
32   European Commission (2004e).   18
the country, to giving international and interregional transport infrastructure clear priority and to 
suppress or impose conditions on aid for regional airports.  
Even if agriculture is still of importance for some rural areas in the new Member States, it is 
questionable if this sector will be a driving force for growth and employment. In contrast, major 
restructuring and labour adjustment are still needed in some countries which will add to the 
expected decrease of the share of agriculture in gross value added and employment. 
Consequently, assistance for agriculture was reduced. Moreover, efforts were made to give higher 
importance to rural development aimed at offering alternative employment at the expense of state 
aids for the processing industry and on-farm investment support.  
 
5  Effective use of funds  
The fourth elemental condition for  the European Funds to have a real impact is that they are 
effectively implemented, including an efficient administration and that crowding-out can be 
avoided. 
The extent to which EU cohesion policy will be turned into capital formation depends on the 
magnitude of the administrative costs as these divert expenditures from productive investments. 
Costs can result form insufficient management and can be improved by capacity-building 
measures increasing public administrative efficiency. Though necessary, such measures will in 
turn diminish resources for investment. Costs can also result from regulatory complexity. The 
requirements of the Structural Funds regulations imply somewhat complex procedures and thus 
transaction costs for programming, monitoring, evaluations and control systems. Simplifications 
have been introduced, but there is a trade-off between simplicity and accountability. All the more 
so since the final accountability for the use of Structural Funds lies in the hands of the European 
Commission. The regulation for the current 2000-2006 programming period has tried to set 
incentives to achieve high quality in the implementation of Structural Funds programmes by 
introducing two new instruments. First, the “n+2”-rule has been introduced, according to which 
all commitments not implemented at the end of the second year after the year of commitment are 
automatically decommitted. Second, in 2004 the allocation of the reserve of about 4 per cent of 
total funding 2000-2006 has been executed with rather heterogeneous results (European 
Commission 2004d).  
Structural Funds can also only effectively contribute to real convergence, if they do not lead to a 
crowding out of private or public national investments.
33 However, as Structural Funds mainly 
                                                 
33  This risk has been highlighted e.g. by Ederveen et al. 2002.   19
co-finance typical public investments where market failures can be assumed like the provision of 
environmental, educational or transport infrastructure, a crowding out of private investment is 
rather unlikely as they should rather stimulate private investments by an improvement of the 
business environment and reduced transaction costs. For national public investments, the 
principle of additionality has been enshrined in the Structural Funds regulations requiring for 
Objective 1 programmes that Member States agree ex-ante with the European Commission on a 
target for national public eligible expenditure that generally should not be lower than the level 
achieved during the former programming period. Ex-post and mid-term verifications for the 
periods 1994-99 and 2000-06 show that in most Member States additionality has at least nearly 
been met and that this result can be expected as well for the current period (European 
Commission 2004c, table 15 of chapter 2). 
 
Conclusions 
As has been shown by impact assessments based on macroeconomic modelling, in spite of its 
limited financial means, EU cohesion policy can have a substantial impact on catching-up. 
However, it can only have significant effects if several conditions are fulfilled, and here 
experience in the recent years shows that room for improvement exists. Among the various 
factors influencing the effectiveness of Structural Funds in achieving real convergence, 
particularly against the background of enlargement, the following aspects are important: 
•  Stronger spatial concentration, 
•  Better thematic concentration, 
•  More effective use of funds.  
 
Spatial concentration means concentrating Structural Funds on those regions and Member States 
most in need. This implies, first, a decision whether to continue supporting regions in relatively 
rich Member States; and, second, if and to what extent to continue the support in regions whose 
eligibility is affected negatively by the statistical effect of enlargement. According to the Draft 
Framework Regulation of Structural Funds for the programming period 2007 – 2013 (European 
Commission 2004f) the European Commission proposes to strengthen the focus on the new 
Convergence Objective by allocating 78.5 per cent of the resources to this objective, in 
comparison to 72 per cent for the Objective 1 regions in the current programming period. 
Structural Funds in “statistical effect regions” would be continued, but only on a transitional and 
decreasing basis that cannot be prolonged for the years after 2013.    20
Spatial concentration also means not counteracting market forces in the selection of areas for 
support. As a response to the possible equity-efficiency trade-off, i.e. that high catch-up growth 
might temporarily be accompanied by higher inequalities between regions, a sequencing 
approach initially emphasising growth of the national economy as a whole and at a later stage 
giving more prominence to addressing regional disparities could be followed in order to make 
regional policy more efficient. In parallel, the catching-up process of poorer regions might be 
accelerated by supporting their growth poles and by building on existing clusters. But one should 
avoid any artificial dispersion of economic activities or creation of new clusters. 
Thematic concentration, in turn, means choosing an effective investment mix. The question of 
what is an effective investment mix can only be answered on a case by case basis after a sound 
analysis of the situation in the corresponding Member State and region. However, some general 
arguments can be made. First, infrastructure endowment can be seen as a precondition for 
growth, though not as a growth-enhancing investment per se. Second, even if it generally takes 
time to achieve a needed enhancement of human capital, this can be regarded as key to long-term 
growth. Third, aid to the productive sector should be limited to specific projects enhancing the 
business environment, and support for start-ups and SMEs. Thus, in the draft new ERDF 
regulation business support is always directly linked to SMEs. Fourth, support for rural areas 
should take into account the limited and declining importance of agriculture in the process of 
catching-up, and should be focused on providing alternative employment and development 
opportunities. Finally, projects of doubtful economic benefit – such as for example cultural 
projects –- should not be co-financed.  
In order to guarantee the effective use of Structural Funds, the draft regulation proposes further 
simplifications for the management of Structural Funds in order to reduce administrative 
problems and costs. In addition, particularly in the new Member States, building up the necessary 
administrative capacity will be of crucial importance. 
While the draft new regulation for Structural Funds aims to introduce a stronger regional and 
thematic concentration, the contribution of EU cohesion policy to real convergence will depend 
predominantly on Member States’ own national and regional policies. The role of regional and 
national authorities in setting up strategies to support and implement Structural Funds programs 
will be of key importance. More broadly, Structural Funds cannot achieve a self-supporting 
growth led by additional private investment, if national economic policies have not achieved 
sound framework conditions. 
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